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This paper traces the development of the Sino-Soviet military rapprochement from its beginnings in December 1988 to the present. A brief survey of the turbulent relationship between the two countries is presented as background, followed by the strategic and economic rationale behind endeavors to normalize relations. Visits by senior officers, potential arms sales, troop reductions, and efforts to institute confidence building measures along the border are cited as evidence of growing military ties. The paper closes by highlighting implications for the United States and concludes that the military rapprochement will continue. What compelled Gorbachev to pursue this endeavor, to make significant concessions not only regarding the "three obstacles"
but the highly contentious border issue as well? Likewise, why was China so receptive, rather than simply rebuffing the gesture as it had previous advances by Gorbachev's predecessors? In essence, the goals of the two countries had evolved to the point where the respective national interests and strategic concerns clearly warranted some sort of normalized relations.
The Soviets see themselves as an Asian and a Pacific power.
Twenty percent of the citizens of the USSR are of Asian nationality and one-third of its territory is east of Irkutsk, isolated from the primary population and industrial centers of the country. The USSR strongly desires to participate in the economic growth of the Pacific Rim, but realizes that its formidable military presence in the area has been threatening, not only to China, but to other regional nations. Given this atmosphere, Moscow recognizes that economic agreements and further penetration of the area's markets will be extremely difficult to attain unless the Soviet Union is perceived as less menacing, a goal that can be achieved through decreased levels of armed forces in the area. Another facet of national security also drove the Soviets.
Although unlikely, if hostilities were to erupt in Europe, the Soviets did not want to confront the strategic dilemma of fighting a two-front war against NATO to the west and China on the east. If a rapprochement with the PRC was successful, not only would the USSR's "rear" be secure in the event of a European conflict, but in the absence of a threat from China, forces allocated to the Far Foreign Minister Qian Qichen also met, and from the change in rhetoric it became apparent that the Cambodian question, while still requiring resolution, had been down-graded in significance and was no longer a major stumbling block. 52 Clearly, the frequency of contacts was mounting. China's interest in logistics matters may be in response to an October, 1989 comment by Vice Admiral Zhang Xusan, Deputy
Commander of the Chinese Navy, in which he characterized the Navy as a branch of the PLA and announced the Navy's intention to build a "comprehensive and modern logistics system. ' 5 7 Whether this statement and the subsequent visits by the logistics delegation and General Nechayev are related remains speculative, but the Chinese are expressing a growing interest in Soviet military systems.
As early as September, 1988, a member of the Chinese delegation to Britain's state-of-the-art Farnborough Airshow stated that China was seeking to buy Soviet missiles. 58 --notification in advance of all exercises of land forces that involve over 13,000 people;
--advance notification of movements, transfer and concentration of troops above established minimum parameters;
--exchange of annual plans of military activities that are subject to notification;
--invitation of observers of the countries concerned to all exercises, movements or transfers of armed forces that exceed the established numerical minimum;
--development of necessary measures of inspection and control.
It must be understood that military rapprochement is only part of a broader process of normalized relations, one of the prizes of which is economic advantage in the Asia-Pacific Rim. The major players are now Japan and the United States, but rormalization will permit China to increasingly devote her attention to this area.
The USSR, offering the oil, mineral, and hydro-electric resources of the Siberian interior and utilizing the Soviet-Chinese rail and transportation network as a conduit to market, can assert itself as well.
For the United States, Japan may well prove to be the linchpin. Will she accept closer ties with these countries at the expense of America? More intriguingly, will she shift towards a USSR that is assuming the appearance of a more benign, nonthreatening nation? Such an approach by the Soviets may motivate Japan to discount its requirement for security guarantees from the United States, prompting a more independent course particularly if economic tension between the two Western powers persists.
The major impediment to a warmer Japan-Soviet relationship Regardless of whether the Soviets present such an offer, the United States should encourage Japan to serve as a counter to both the USSR and China. This will cause a true multi-polar structure to evolve in the region vice the current triangular (United States, Soviet Union, China) one. Were corresponding assistance provided to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations organization, intensified economic competition and even greater stability might result.
Until such developments occur, Washington's interaction with the USSR and China will be much more balanced. "The more mature Sino-Soviet relationship.. .has become less amenable to manipulation than ever before." 7 7 It will no longer be as easy from a global perspective for the United States to play the "China card." The United States has now reached the end of an era. This requires that Washington assume a more sophisticated approach when dealing with issues involving the Soviet Union and China. Although a formal coalition between the latter two powers will not materialize, there is every expectation that the military rapprochement is ongoing and will continue.
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